

12 AUGUST 1946

I N D E X

Of

WITNESSES

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I N D E X

Of

EXHIBITS

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273		Message Concerning Special Investigation of Inner Mongolia		3686
274		The Basic Regulation of Strengthening and Expansion of the Mongolian Army - 1 May 1939, G.H.Q. of the Expedition Forces to Mongolia		3688
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1 Monday, 12 August, 1946

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4 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL  
5 FOR THE FAR EAST  
6 Court House of the Tribunal  
7 War Ministry Building  
8 Tokyo, Japan

9 The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,  
10 at 0930.

11 - - -

12 Appearances:

13 For the Tribunal, same as before: HONORABLE  
14 R. B. PAL, Member from India, now sitting.

15 For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

16 For the Defense Section, same as before.

17 - - -

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19  
20 (English to Japanese and Japanese  
21 to English interpretation was made by the  
22 Language Section, IMTFE.)  
23  
24  
25

1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session  
3 and ready to hear any matter brought before it.

4 THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present  
5 except OKAWA and MATSUI, both of whom are represented  
6 by counsel. MATSUI is in the hospital. I have a  
7 certificate from the prison surgeon of Sugamo Prison.  
8 This certificate will be recorded.

9 Mr. Parkinson.

10 MR. PARKINSON: If the Tribunal please, at  
11 the conclusion of the Friday session of the Tribunal,  
12 I was about to read the "Message Concerning Special  
13 Investigation of Inner Mongolia." This document  
14 likewise covers certain bombing operations in North  
15 China.

16 (Reading): "Message Concerning Special  
17 Investigation of Inner Mongolia. Document Number:  
18 Mo-Jo-Hatsu No. 98 (Top Secret). Date: June 19,  
19 SHOWA 13 (1938). Sender: ISHIMOTO, Torazo, Chief  
20 of Staff of the Japanese Army in Mongolia. Addressee:  
21 TOJO, Hideki, Vice-Minister of War.

22 "We are projecting the above-titled investi-  
23 gation according to the plan in the appended papers.  
24 I herein beg to request you, by order, that if there  
25 are any officers under your command who wish to

1 "participate (as inspector) in the project to please  
2 inform me of it before July 10.

3 "P.S. It will not be necessary for the  
4 participators (inspectors) to join us all through  
5 the investigation. They may leave or join us at  
6 Hohokoto or Paotou, etc.

7 "Plan for A Special Investigation of Inner  
8 Mongolia. Date: April, SHOWA 13 (1938). Planned by:  
9 The General Staff of the HASUNUMA Forces.

10 "1. Object of the Plan.

11 "The object of this plan lies in con-  
12 sidering the strategic operations against Outer  
13 Mongolia and making concrete investigations in the  
14 strategic geography of the important districts in the  
15 Mongolia border and at the same time in examining on  
16 the spot the general materials already acquired, as  
17 well as in actually investigating matters concerning  
18 natural resources.

19 "2. Outline of the Plan.

20 "1. To examine on the spot the  
21 materials already acquired, and to obtain new mater-  
22 ials by investigating unknown districts as much as  
23 possible, and thereby to reach a precise synthetic  
24 geographical judgment.

25 "2. To lay the main objective of the



1 "Investigation on the northern district of the Yinshan  
2 Range, and to reach a general and partial geographical  
3 judgment in preparation for various operations.

4 "3. As regards resources, to examine  
5 the already acquired materials, especially the con-  
6 ditions of agriculture and stock raising.

7 "4. To make astronomical observations  
8 and plane survey by the surveying engineers in order  
9 to have a precise knowledge of locations and to re-  
10 vise the charts.

11 "5. With the Investigation Section of  
12 the Army General Staff Office as the main body, the  
13 investigation party shall be composed of selected of-  
14 ficers and men, and specialists of various circles.  
15 The party forms one body, but shall be dispatched  
16 partially, whenever necessary.

17 "6. The period of the investigation  
18 shall be pre-arranged as from the end of August,  
19 SHOWA 13 (1938) to the middle of October of the  
20 same year. The reports of the investigation shall  
21 be completed within two months after the investiga-  
22 tion is completed.

23 "7. The necessary expenditure shall  
24 be paid from the ordered budget of the Investigation  
25 Section of the Army General Staff Office with the

1 "exception of particular cases.

2 "3. Particulars of the Plan.

3 "(1). The map of the course to be  
4 taken in the investigation is in Appendix No. 1.

5 "(2). The matters to be investigated  
6 and the persons in charge are in Appendix 2.

7 "(3). The plan of organization,  
8 equipment and supply of provisions and fuel of the  
9 investigation party is in Appendix 3.

10 "(4). The outline for preparation of  
11 the investigation is in Appendix 4.

12 "(5). The outline for the compilation  
13 of the investigation reports is in Appendix 5.

14 "(6). The necessary expenditure of  
15 the investigation is in Appendix 6.

16 "Records of Information by the Air Force  
17 at Nanking. Date: August 12.

18 "The General Conditions of Naval Air Force  
19 activities.

20 "1. The bombing of Nanchang.

21 "On the 7th of August, SHOWA 13 (1938), in  
22 the teeth of a heavy thunder storm we bombed the old  
23 and new airfields at Nanchang. We could not find  
24 enemy planes in the air or on the ground in either  
25 place and the anti-aircraft guns were not furious.

1 "Besides the airfields we bombed the Nanchang Station  
2 and munitions depots south of the station, setting  
3 some places ablaze.

4 "2. The bombing of Chian and Changsh chen.--

5 If the Court please, I am just advised the  
6 translators do not have that second portion, the  
7 "Records of Information by the Air Force at Nanking,"  
8 and they request that they be enabled to translate  
9 it as I read.

10 THE PRESIDENT: Well, you had better proceed  
11 with the reading of it.

12 MR. PARKINSON: I can forego that?

13 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, sir. There is not  
14 very much of it.

15 MR. PARKINSON: Did I understand, your  
16 Honor--

17 THE PRESIDENT: It is only a little over a  
18 page. They ought to be able to translate that with-  
19 out any break being necessary.

20 MR. PARKINSON: Yes, sir.

21 (Reading): "Records of Information by the  
22 Air Force at Nanking. Date: August 12.

23 "The General Conditions of Naval Air Force  
24 activities.

25 "1. The bombing of Nanchang.

1           "On the 7th of August, SHOWA 13 (1938),  
2     in the teeth of a heavy thunder storm we bombed the  
3     old and new airfields at Nanchang. We could not find  
4     enemy planes in the air or on the ground in either  
5     place and the anti-aircraft guns were not furious.  
6     Besides the airfields we bombed the Nanchang Station  
7     and munitions depots south of the station, setting  
8     some places ablaze.

9           "2. The bombing of Chian and Changsh chen.

10          "On the 9th we bombed the Chian airfield.  
11     We could not find enemy planes both in the air and  
12     on the ground. Another unit reached Changsh chen,  
13     but could not see enemy planes in the airfield. So  
14     the unit bombed freight cars in the stationyard and  
15     munitions depots, some of which were destroyed by  
16     fire.

17          "3. The bombing of Wu-Hang San chen.

18          "On the 11th, flying through shreds of  
19     cloud which were left by the typhoon, the naval air  
20     units carried out air raids on Wu-Hang San chen. We  
21     found no enemy planes in the air, and only a small  
22     number of them on the ground. Our attacking units  
23     carried out exhaustive raids, dropping hundreds of  
24     bombs on the air defense batteries, enemy defense  
25     positions and other military establishments at



1 "Toshan (?), Wuchang and Kweishan, Hanyang. All  
2 our planes returned after having destroyed the  
3 central district of the enemy's military establish-  
4 ments.

5 "The Japan-Soviet Incident.

6 "(1) The Information Department of the  
7 Foreign Ministry on the 10th August, SHOWA 13 (1938)  
8 at 10 PM published the following statement about the  
9 agreement reached between Japan and Soviet Russia on  
10 the termination of hostilities.

11 "As the result of a conference between  
12 Litvinov, Soviet Chief Commissioner of Foreign  
13 Affairs, and Ambassador SHIGEMITSU, on the night of  
14 August 10th, an agreement has been reached on the  
15 following items:

16 "A. Both sides shall stop military oper-  
17 ations at noon (the maritime province hour) on the  
18 11th.

19 "B. Both Japanese and Soviet troops  
20 should maintain the line as of twelve o'clock AM  
21 (the maritime province hour) on the 11th. It has  
22 been decided that the practical measures to fulfill  
23 the agreement shall be conferred between the repre-  
24 sentatives of both troops.

25 "C. According to the announcement of the

1 "War Ministry at 1800 on the 11th, tranquility  
2 reigns over the districts near Changkufeng since  
3 the morning of the 11th."

4 THE PRESIDENT: Have you your appendices  
5 referred to in the Mongolian Plan, Mr. Parkinson?

6 MR. PARKINSON: No, sir; however, this  
7 document No. 273 -- that is, exhibit No. 273 consisted,  
8 in addition to the plan for the investigation of  
9 Inner Mongolia, as I stated, certain bombing opera-  
10 tions and I presumably should have likewise stated  
11 the cessation of previous activity by the same army  
12 in Mongolia.

13 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Logan.

14 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, this  
15 excerpt, document No. 623, apparently comes from a  
16 bound volume entitled "Confidential Daily Reports  
17 from China Expeditionary Forces." Now, that document  
18 has not been marked as an exhibit for identification  
19 and the way the excerpt has been set up -- although  
20 it was explained by Mr. Parkinson, yet on the face  
21 of the document submitted it purports to be a message  
22 sent June 17, 1938, and yet without any break whatso-  
23 ever it refers to future events which occurred and  
24 had actually occurred in August, 1938.

25 THE PRESIDENT: Are you asking the Court's

1 assistance?

2 MR. LOGAN: I am sorry.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Are you asking the Court's  
4 assistance?

5 MR. LOGAN: Yes, your Honor, I would like  
6 to have the volume marked for identification so we  
7 could check the dates.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Can you give them that,  
9 Mr. Parkinson?

10 MR. PARKINSON: The original volume, if the  
11 Tribunal please, has been lodged with the Secretariat.  
12 Furthermore, the extent of the excerpt was covered  
13 in a motion filed by the prosecution on the second of  
14 July.

15 THE PRESIDENT: The defense can inspect  
16 that document with the Secretary and if they need  
17 any more material they can ask me in Chambers to  
18 direct they get it.

19 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, perhaps  
20 I have not explained it properly. This excerpt comes  
21 from that entire volume there and that volume has not  
22 been marked for identification, so looking at this,  
23 we do not know where it comes from. We would like to  
24 have that volume marked for identification in the  
25 case.

1 MR. PARKINSON: The document itself is  
2 stamped on the outside as exhibit 273 by this  
3 Tribunal.

4 THE PRESIDENT: So Mr. Bowman told me.  
5 Apparently it was handed down from the bench below  
6 us to the prosecutor's table. All this debate has  
7 been about just nothing. Why can't we avoid these  
8 unnecessary interruptions?

9 MR. PARKINSON: May I proceed, your Honor?

10 THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

11 MR. PARKINSON: I now offer in evidence  
12 IPS or prosecution's document No. 643 and desire to  
13 read therefrom an excerpt entitled, "The Basic  
14 Regulation of Strengthening and Expansion of the  
15 Mongolian Army."

16 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual  
17 terms.

18 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document  
19 No. 643 will receive exhibit No. 274.

20 (Whereupon, prosecution's exhibit  
21 No. 274 was received in evidence.)

22 MR. PARKINSON: Does your Honor wish the  
23 certificate read?

24 THE PRESIDENT: No, not unless the defense  
25 want it read for some good cause.



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1 MR. PARKINSON: (Reading)

2 "THE BASIC REGULATION OF STRENGTHENING  
3 AND EXPANSION OF THE MONGOLIAN ARMY -

4 1 May 1939, G.H.Q. of the Expedition  
5 Forces to Mongolia.

6 "1. This regulation is to clarify the principles of  
7 the establishment of the Mongolian Army, and is to fix  
8 the basic standard of establishment, training and all  
9 the other applications of the Mongolian Army.

10 "2. Each organization in charge is to schedule all  
11 the matters of military administration such as the  
12 military discipline, strategy, training, and moreover,  
13 enlistment, reward, provision, supply of horses and  
14 weapons, in accordance with No. 11 of the System  
15 regulation of the Mongolian Army.

16 "Article 1. The basic principle of establishment of  
17 the Mongolian Army is to defend Mongolia under  
18 the control of the Japanese Commandant, and is  
19 to become the motive power to develop and rouse  
20 the whole Mongolians basing on the Mongolian ideology.

21 "Article 2. The establishment and application of the  
22 Mongolian Army is to be entirely based upon the  
23 first Article, viz., concerning the military  
24 discipline, education, formation, training,  
25 equipment, arrangement and all the others, and

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18 the control of the Japanese Commandant, and is  
19 to become the motive power to develop and rouse  
20 the whole Mongolians basing on the Mongolian ideology.

21 "Article 2. The establishment and application of the  
22 Mongolian Army is to be entirely based upon the  
23 first Article, viz., concerning the military  
24 discipline, education, formation, training,  
25 equipment, arrangement and all the others, and

1 is to take a measure suited to the traditional  
2 characteristics of Mongolians in accordance  
3 with the emergency of time so as to complete  
4 its contents, especially its material reformation. But the attitude such as to arrange  
5 outward form without reflecting to substance  
6 of the Mongolian Army is to be forbidden.  
7 Especially, training which strengthens the  
8 development of superior spiritual elements  
9 of the Mongolian tradition, and emphasizes  
10 the simple life to endure hardships and privations, is needed.

13 "Article 3. The emphasis of military discipline  
14 is the foundation of the establishment of Army  
15 measures which suited to reform the contents  
16 are necessary. Strong cooperation led by  
17 leaders is necessary as well as to get the  
18 help and reliance of Mongolians.

19 "Article 4. Concerning the reformation of education  
20 and training, it is necessary to let the whole  
21 Army, especially its leaders, know thoroughly  
22 the principle of the establishment of Army and  
23 to strengthen their traditional spirit to fight  
24 against Communism with a pride of being a  
25 participator in the establishment of the

1 Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.  
2 As to training, stress is to be put under  
3 the training of division, and especially  
4 it is necessary to let them become proficient  
5 with long time raiding actions in barren lands.  
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1 Therefore, to guide the strong and sturdy Mon-  
2 golian characteristic properly, and to put much  
3 importance to the training of leaders is nec-  
4 essary. Moreover, leaders ought to be given  
5 the knowledge of propaganda and pacification.

6 "Article 5. Concerning the formation and equipment,  
7 the main point is to be put to make them strong,  
8 suiting their characteristics in accordance  
9 with the eduction and discipline without sticking  
10 to formal inauguration, and firstly, it is  
11 necessary to complete its material contents,  
12 especially the arrangement of leaders.

13 "Therefore, the plan is to enforce re-  
14 formation basing upon the fixed schedule; and  
15 to realize the arrangement of contents, es-  
16 pecially the arrangement and expansion of edu-  
17 cational organization and special troops by the  
18 end of 1940, so as to prepare for the strength-  
19 ening and expansion after 1941.

20 "Article 6. After 1941, in view of the financial,  
21 human and other material resources, the number  
22 of total forces is to be expanded to the  
23 extent of 12,000, and the establishment of  
24 mechanized forces, especially anti-mechanized  
25 and anti-gas forces is to be arranged besides

1 the strengthening of fixed number of forces,  
2 increase of divisions, and the enforcement of  
3 reformation of equipment.

4 "Article 7. It is necessary to let the whole Inner  
5 Mongolians participate in the accomplishment of  
6 the purpose of establishment of the Army; be-  
7 sides possibly quick investigation concerning  
8 the right and wrong or possibility of the  
9 enforcement of the so-called 'Cossack' system  
10 is to be prepared so as to expect the obtain-  
11 ment of many strong youth of Mongolia.

12  
13 "Secret Telegram 6 July 1939

14 "Secret Telegram of the NAMI Forces No. 708

15 "TO: Vice-Minister and Deputy Chief of Staff

16 "FROM: The Chief of Staff of the NAMI Forces.

17 "The control regulation of the third  
18 national ships which entered Swatow Harbor has  
19 decided as follows through consultation with the  
20 Fifth Fleet:

21 "1. The entrance of general third national ships  
22 to Swatow, landing of freights and transportation of  
23 travelers shall be prohibited for awhile. But for  
24 the convenience of the third national residents in  
25 Swatow, one ship of each nation and a part of freights

1 and travelers shall be permitted to be landed or  
2 to enter once a week under the following conditions:

3 "1. The permission of entrance of the third  
4 national ships must be applied to the Navy  
5 senior commandant twenty-four hours before  
6 their arrival to the harbor.

7 "2. The freights to be landed must be the  
8 necessities of life or communications to the  
9 third national persons in Swatow and its vicinity  
10 and it must be permitted to be necessary for  
11 their life through the examination by the  
12 authorities.

13 "3. In case the landing of freights, the list  
14 of goods must be offered to the Japanese  
15 authorities. Permission shall be issued after  
16 their agreement through the inspection of the  
17 goods at the appointed place.

18 "4. The regulation of landing and boarding of  
19 the third powers' nationals shall be restricted  
20 as follows:

21 "a. Landing from the third powers ships  
22 shall be permitted to those who have  
23 identity papers of the Japanese  
24 diplomatic authorities.

25 "b. Permission of boarding shall be

1 limited to those who were permitted by the  
2 Japanese authorities.

3 "c. Departure must be done within six hours  
4 after her entrance.

5 "5. The Japanese authorities will lay an en-  
6 bargo disregarding the above-mentioned  
7 articles, if necessary.

8 "2. If the navy side permits the entrance of a third  
9 national ship according to the Article 1, necessary  
10 matters must be reported to the Army authorities  
11 without delay, and the Navy side is to take charge  
12 of watch upon the ship during her anchorage in the  
13 harbor.

14 "3. As to the ships which were permitted to enter  
15 the harbor by the Navy side, the Army side is to  
16 examine the freights to be landed comparing with the  
17 detailed list. Permission of landing and transporta-  
18 tion is to be limited only to the goods which are  
19 considered to be necessary for the life of the third  
20 nationals.

21 "4. As to the ships which entered in, disregarding  
22 our regulation, no freight shall be permitted to  
23 land, and the Navy side is to watch and control  
24 them with the cooperation of the Army side.

25 "5. The Navy and the Army are to cooperate and help



1 each other beyond the limitation of the above-mentioned  
2 regulation, if necessary."

3 MR. PARKINSON: May I ask your Honor's in-  
4 dulgence for just one moment, please?

5 If the Tribunal please, I now offer in  
6 evidence IPS document No. 1370, this being a pamphlet  
7 or booklet, entitled "The Activities of the Imperial  
8 Navy in the China Incident," Volume 2. We have a  
9 certificate showing that this was issued by the  
10 Naval Information Disseminating Department of the  
11 Japanese Naval Ministry.

12 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.  
13 How much of this do you propose to read?

14 MR. PARKINSON: If the Court please, I  
15 should like to waive reading the entire document.  
16 It is merely the details of naval and air force  
17 operations day by day, from July, 1937 through  
18 May, 1939.

19 THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything to which  
20 you desire to draw our attention?

21 MR. PARKINSON: Not specifically, no.

22 THE CLERK: Prosecution's document 1370  
23 has been marked Exhibit 275.

24 (Whereupon, prosecution's exhibit No.  
25 275 was received in evidence).

1 THE PRESIDENT: Well, we certainly don't  
2 want you to read this document, Mr. Parkinson.

3 MR. PARKINSON: The feeling of the prosecu-  
4 tion was this, your Honor: the Court might possibly  
5 take judicial notice of the fact that the Japanese  
6 Navy and Air Force was active throughout these years,  
7 but could not take judicial notice, perhaps, of all  
8 the details of operations, and we felt they should  
9 be of record and of record only. Is that agreeable,  
10 your Honor?

11 THE PRESIDENT: Well, you have nothing to  
12 point out, you say?

13 MR. PARKINSON: Nothing specifically, no, sir.  
14 I am just advised that the first five pages --

15 THE PRESIDENT: You had better be sure  
16 about that, because the Members of the Court may  
17 feel that they have no obligation on them to peruse  
18 that document. They will have enough to peruse  
19 without it.

20 The representative of China draws attention  
21 to page 42, and more particularly to the passage  
22 headed, "The Imperial Message." However, that has  
23 no particular significance from your viewpoint.

24 MR. PARKINSON: Not particularly, in rela-  
25 tion to this document, your Honor.

1 THE PRESIDENT: Well, you are not prepared  
2 to read any part of it, so we are just wasting time  
3 in dwelling on it. You had better proceed with the  
4 rest of your evidence.

5 My attention has been drawn to the third  
6 paragraph on page one, which seems to summarize the  
7 hole document. That part, at least, might be read  
8 into the record.

9 MR. PARKINSON: I have just been advised  
10 that the first five pages of this document are  
11 really not a part of the document and do not appear  
12 in the Japanese version, but constitute a summary,  
13 and if agreeable to the Court I will read those first  
14 five pages.

15 THE PRESIDENT: Have those five pages been  
16 translated into Japanese?

17 MR. PARKINSON: I am informed they have not,  
18 your Honor.

19 THE PRESIDENT: Well, don't read them.  
20 They are too long to be read now. We can't sit  
21 here while five pages are being translated.

22 DR. KIYOSE: It appears to me, Mr. President,  
23 that those five pages now in question are not a  
24 part of the evidence, but an explanation prepared  
25 by the prosecution.

1 THE PRESIDENT: That is a sound point.  
2 I think we must disallow that summary.

3 MR. PARKINSON: If the Court please, I now  
4 wish to offer an excerpt from the Japan Year Book  
5 of 1942 - 1942, and ask that it be marked as an  
6 exhibit and with the letter "A". I have a certificate  
7 of authenticity as to that year book from the Home  
8 Ministry.

9 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual  
10 terms.

11 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document  
12 1756 will receive exhibit No. 276-A.

13 (Whereupon, prosecution's exhibit No.  
14 276-A was received in evidence).

15 THE PRESIDENT: I notice you have a cer-  
16 tificate covering an excerpt from the Japan Year  
17 Book. When do you decide to get a certificate?

18 MR. PARKINSON: The certificate which I  
19 have before me, your Honor, goes to the Japan Year  
20 Book itself for that volume dated 1941 and 1942.  
21 In other words, it is my viewpoint that if there  
22 is to be an excerpt from a document that the document  
23 itself should be authenticated.

24 MR. FURNESS: If the Court please, it is  
25 my understanding that the Japan Year Book is a



1 book prepared by a private corporation and is not an  
2 official document in any sense. It was apparently  
3 found in the War Ministry, but I should think it  
4 would be like any other book which was found in the  
5 War Ministry, and therefore would not be admissible  
6 as an official document. For example, if the World  
7 Almanac was found in the Home Ministry, on this  
8 basis, it would be admissible as an official  
9 document. Obviously, it is not.

10 THE PRESIDENT: Well, there isn't much  
11 merit in this objection. After all, it is the  
12 Japan Year Book, no doubt. We don't question that.

13 MR. FURNESS: It appears to have been pre-  
14 pared by the Japan Times Press for the Foreign  
15 Affairs Association of Japan, both of which are un-  
16 official organizations. Those are private corpor-  
17 ations.

18 THE PRESIDENT: Well, that may or may not  
19 be the fact. We have no proof of it. But, never-  
20 theless, the objection is petty.

21 MR. PARKINSON: (Reading)

22 "EXCERPTS FROM THE JAPAN YEAR BOOK

23 "1941-42 (p. 1000)"

24 "1940:

25 "March 4 - Haichow in Shantung Province occupied by

1 Japanese troops.

2 "March 30 - The Central Government of the Chinese  
3 Republic established under Wang Ching-wei at  
4 Nanking.

5 "April 4 - the Yunnan Railway attacked by Japanese  
6 air units."

7 I now offer as section B to Exhibit 276 an  
8 excerpt from the Japan Year Book, 1941-1942, page 997-  
9 998, and ask that it be marked exhibit 276-B.

10 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

11 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document  
12 1756-D will receive exhibit No. 276-B.

13 (Whereupon, prosecution's exhibit  
14 No. 276-B was received in evidence.)

15 MR. PARKINSON: (Reading)

16 "EXCERPT FROM THE 'JAPAN YEAR BOOK 1941-42'

17 (pp 997-998)

18 "COMPREHENSIVE RESULTS OF THE JAPANESE  
19 MILITARY OPERATIONS IN CHINA

20 During July 1937-June 1941

21 "(Report of the Army Information Section, the Imperial  
22 Headquarters)

23 1. Estimated number of Chinese killed 2,015,000

24 The loss of Chinese forces, includ-  
25 ing death, the wounded, captives,

etc.

3,800,000

The booty:

Arms

482,257

Tanks, cars, motor-trucks

1,475

Trains, engines, carriages

2,449

Warships and vessels

410

"2. Results of Air Forces' Activities,  
including Nomenhan Incident:

Enemy warplanes brought down

1,744

Destroyed on the ground

233

Total loss of the enemy

1,977

"3. Losses of the Imperial Army, including Nomanhan Incident:

Killed

109,250

## Lost warplanes

203"

THE PRESIDENT: These losses in men appear

to be heavier than those already tendered from Chinese sources.

MR. PARKINSON: Yes, sir, they do.

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1 MR. PARKINSON: I now offer an exhibit, IPS  
2 document 454, being a speech made by Premier KOISO  
3 before the 85th Diet Session.

4 I have a certificate from the General Affairs  
5 Section of the Cabinet Secretariat relating to a vol-  
6 ume of their reports included within which appears  
7 this speech.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

9 DEPUTY CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's  
10 document 454 will receive exhibit No. 277.

11 (Whereupon, prosecution's exhibit  
12 No. 277 was received in evidence.)

13 MR. PARKINSON: "Speech Made By Premier  
14 KOISO Before the 85th Diet Session," which I am  
15 informed was in 1944.

16 (Reading) "Unexpectedly I received the Im-  
17 perial Command to form the cabinet with Admiral YONAI  
18 and to assume the grave responsibility of administering  
19 the affairs of state. Truly I am filled with trepida-  
20 tion. Under the extremely serious situation, I firmly  
21 resolve to make every effort in order to meet the  
22 Emperor's wishes. It is my greatest delight that I  
23 could get the chance of revealing the government's  
24 attitude on the occasion of this 85th Diet Session.  
25 His Majesty, the Emperor, issued a specially gracious



1 rescript at today's opening ceremony, by which we were  
2 deeply moved. In obedience to the Imperial Rescript,  
3 I, with your cooperation, will carry out the important  
4 duties of wartime and try to achieve the object of the  
5 war as soon as possible. By these means I wish to set  
6 his Majesty's heart at ease. Now is the most important  
7 time when the fate of the Empire will be decided.

8 "I think this is the very time when we should  
9 manifest our glorious and everlasting history, in  
10 accordance with the divine spirit of our Imperial ances-  
11 tors, and should keep our national constitution which  
12 is quite unique in the world. Holding the firm belief  
13 of victory with 100 million compatriots, and concen-  
14 trating all efforts, I wish to gather the national  
15 strength together with a harmonious national unity to  
16 achieve the war's end, in accordance with the expected  
17 operation of our armed forces, which will soon be  
18 realized, to destroy America and Britain. This Greater  
19 East Asia War, as stated clearly in the Imperial  
20 Rescript declaring the war, is one which Japan was com-  
21 pelled to start in order to protect herself and simul-  
22 taneously has as its chief object the reconstruction  
23 of Greater East Asia. The fate of the YAMATO race,  
24 as well as that of one billion Asiatic people, will be  
25 decided by this war.

1           "The good points of our national character,  
2 which have been inspired by one difficulty after  
3 another in the past, have been actually proven very  
4 often in the process of this war also. The enemy's  
5 attacks against our homeland have become frequent and  
6 are being conducted on a larger scale. In the present  
7 state when enemy landings are feared, we should concen-  
8 trate every effort and sacrifice ourselves to maintain  
9 the national constitution. We should renew our firm  
10 resolution to wage the war and after purifying our-  
11 selves we should pray to God and do our best.

12           "In the front line, our armed forces are fight-  
13 ing bravely day and night without flinching under the  
14 enemy's 'material attack'. Their morale is very high,  
15 and they are fighting very bravely thwarting the enemy's  
16 attacks everywhere. I hereby, together with you, ex-  
17 press my deep gratitude towards the men of the Imperial  
18 forces, and at the same time I mourn for those who  
19 gave their lives in the battles and feel sympathy from  
20 the bottom of my heart for the wounded officers and  
21 soldiers and the bereaved families. Moreover, I pay  
22 my respect to the 100 million compatriots who are dili-  
23 gently engaged in production and national defense under  
24 these serious war conditions and at the same time I do  
25 believe that the people will respond to the efforts of

1 the officers and soldiers at the front.

2 "The situation today is quite serious. The  
3 fate of Japan depends upon today. In order to break  
4 up today's deadlock it is natural that we should cen-  
5 tralize the fundamentals of national policy for man-  
6 agement of state affairs upon the attainment of the ob-  
7 jectives of war, and thru the cooperation between civ-  
8 ilians and the men of the armed forces bring forth a  
9 close tie between the supreme command and the ministers  
10 of state, thus fully realizing the strong leadership  
11 of carrying out the war. This was the reason why the  
12 Supreme Headquarters for the Direction of the War was  
13 set up recently.

14 "It has been decided that hereafter the basic  
15 policy for the management of state affairs should be  
16 decided by this Headquarters, which represents the syn-  
17 thesis of the Supreme Command and the Ministers of  
18 State. All the national plans are to be developed in  
19 accordance with this decision.

20 "The first plan to meet the present war sit-  
21 uation lies in arousing the fighting spirit and the  
22 establishment of the national system for inevitable  
23 victory. It goes without saying that the fighting  
24 spirit should be aroused by promoting the idea of the  
25 national constitution. The firm resolution to keep the

1 the officers and soldiers at the front.

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3 fate of Japan depends upon today. In order to break  
4 up today's deadlock it is natural that we should cen-  
5 tralize the fundamentals of national policy for man-  
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19 accordance with this decision.

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21 uation lies in arousing the fighting spirit and the  
22 establishment of the national system for inevitable  
23 victory. It goes without saying that the fighting  
24 spirit should be aroused by promoting the idea of the  
25 national constitution. The firm resolution to keep the



1 national constitution, which has no equal on the earth,  
2 through all difficulties is the source of the belief  
3 in victory, and the firm conception of national polity  
4 is the greatest source of war power. The arousing of  
5 the fighting spirit can not be expected without the  
6 free expression of the people's will. The government,  
7 at the present stage of decisive battle, wants to share  
8 the patriotic sentiments of the people by letting them  
9 know the real conditions at home and abroad and by  
10 arousing a common feeling of responsibility towards the  
11 war. At the same time, trusting deeply in the people's  
12 loyalty and listening to their fair opinion, the govern-  
13 ment wishes the whole nation to face the national crisis  
14 with a bright spirit.

15 "To guard and maintain the Emperor's reign,  
16 which is coeval with heaven and earth, has been the  
17 national faith of 100,000,000 Japanese for thousands  
18 of years, and it has become the people's flesh and  
19 blood. When this spirit is aroused it turns out to be  
20 the national character lasting for thousands of years,  
21 outwardly crushing the enemy's propaganda, and at home  
22 becoming the basic power of the people's unselfish ser-  
23 vice to the country. And it establishes a firm  
24 national situation. Although there are many plans to  
25 establish a national structure for inevitable victory,

1 the point lies in adopting effective and suitable  
2 measures to break up the deadlocks that are hindering  
3 the production without feigning originality or stick-  
4 ing onto conventionalism. Thus, by renewing the peo-  
5 ple's mind and demanding the fullest cooperation of  
6 the people, I wish to pay more attention to the rais-  
7 ing of the national moral standard.

8 "While the fullest cooperation is being re-  
9 quired of the people, Korea and Formosa, as powerful  
10 parts of the Empire, have been contributing to the  
11 prosperity of the Empire and the achievement of the  
12 war's end, manifesting the special characteristics of  
13 the respective areas. Formerly they have done splen-  
14 didly as special volunteers in the army and navy. It  
15 is a matter for national congratulation that since the  
16 conscription system has been promulgated so many of our  
17 fellow countrymen in Korea and Taiwan are participating  
18 in this Holy War and are devoting themselves for the  
19 sake of the country. At the same time consideration  
20 should be made as to their treatment. The second impor-  
21 tant national policy is intensification of fighting  
22 power. Namely, it is required to concentrate all the  
23 national power that will be available into the rapid  
24 promotion of fighting power, especially that of the air  
25 forces. The key to taking the initiative in the war

1 and developing the war favorably for us lies in these  
2 points: The endeavors of the workers in the muni-  
3 tions factories has never been so necessary as today.  
4 Laying the emphasis on these points we are making  
5 every effort to mobilize everything, including man-  
6 power, goods, money and all other things for war pur-  
7 poses. Such installations and industrial activities  
8 as cannot be effectively turned into fighting power  
9 should be shut down and converted into essential in-  
10 dustry. From these points of view, we have been adopt-  
11 ing suitable measures for some time. Needless to say,  
12 the promotion of munition production is necessary for  
13 the purpose of increasing war power, especially that  
14 of the air forces, and the security and the perfection  
15 of transport on sea and land is quite necessary also.  
16 The government intends to take the most suitable  
17 measures to promote production by breaking up all  
18 bottlenecks.

1           "The third chief point of the national policy  
2 lies in the promotion of increased food production and  
3 the security of the national life. It goes without  
4 saying that the minimum standards of national liveli-  
5 hood should be guaranteed during the war. Up to this  
6 time, the people have endured quite hard living condi-  
7 tions and have been striving to achieve the war's end.  
8 We are much moved to find that this fact is attributable  
9 to our sound national character. The government is  
10 making every effort to improve the situation as much  
11 as possible. We also deem it best to stabilize and  
12 improve the people's livelihood. We also recognize  
13 the necessity of brightening people's minds, which is  
14 most essential in arousing the fighting spirit and pro-  
15 moting efficiency.

16           "The government, immediately after the cabi-  
17 net was formed, took emergency food measures for the  
18 large consuming centers, such as Tokyo, Osaka and so  
19 on. Especially for the production, delivery and dis-  
20 tribution of perishable food, we took temporary meas-  
21 ures, changed the price policy, and adopted other  
22 measures. Generally speaking, there are no worries  
23 about the amount of food produced at home, judging  
24 from the real amount of food which will be obtained  
25 from the Japan-Manchurian combination. It goes without



1 saying, however, that the promotion of food production  
2 is very important and at the same time the food prob-  
3 lem is one of the important factors of victory. For  
4 this reason we are presenting a draft for the supple-  
5 mentary budget to the Diet.

6 "The fourth important policy is the problem  
7 of labor and national mobilization. Under the serious  
8 situation existing today we cannot allow the existence  
9 of even one idle man nor one onlooker, irrespective of  
10 his age or sex. The 100 million people should be  
11 located in the battle line for victory and they must  
12 strive for the achievement of the mission imposed upon  
13 them. Thus only, after we have done our best, can we  
14 expect God's help. Industrialists, company employees,  
15 engineers, farmers and fishermen, all these men as  
16 Industrial Warriors, in accordance with the spirit of  
17 the universal conscription system, and with the men-  
18 tal attitude of drafted men not yet summoned to the  
19 colors, should do their best to fulfill their duties  
20 and to try to attain the maximum efficiency. Only  
21 when they have done so do they deserve the name of  
22 Japanese people, together with the armed forces who are  
23 facing death on the battle fields.

24 "As to the compulsory labor system and the  
25 distribution and control of labor, the government is

1 ready to make adjustments and improvements after inves-  
2 tigation, and at the same time will adopt every means  
3 to complete national mobilization.

4 "The fifth important national policy is the  
5 strengthening of national defense. Recently we have  
6 had several air raids on the western part of the main-  
7 land. At such times the damage has been limited to  
8 the minimum by the united efforts of the government  
9 and the people, which fact has inspired me with great  
10 confidence. In the future, however frequent the air  
11 raids may become, the government and the people should  
12 strive to defend the country with so much the more  
13 fighting spirit. It is today's urgent business to  
14 strengthen the defense of important industrial instal-  
15 lations and to strengthen anti-air raid measures.  
16 Consequently, it is important to devise and establish  
17 immediately a defense system which will meet the real  
18 conditions. A city evacuation plan is now being car-  
19 ried out. As to the security of the inhabitants' lives  
20 in case of air raids, the perfecting of our anti-air  
21 raid system and intensifying of air defense maneuvers,  
22 we are making every effort to put these things into  
23 practice under carefully laid plans. Besides the above,  
24 we should, of course, strive to defend the nation, and  
25 the government has made clear the fact that the whole

1 nation should be armed. The government has also de-  
2 cided on a concrete plan to reinforce the interior  
3 defense organization and intends to carry out this  
4 plan thoroughly.

5 "As to the sixth of the important policies,  
6 I wish to say a few words on the utilization of scien-  
7 tific techniques. Now, the war has begun to bear the  
8 aspect of a 'war of science'. Accordingly, the govern-  
9 ment has set up a special organization which has as  
10 its purpose the unification of the applications of  
11 scientific techniques of both the Army and the Navy,  
12 besides the immediate conversion of Japanese scienti-  
13 fic techniques into war power to meet the present mili-  
14 tary situation, and the planning of the rapid and  
15 smooth mass production of weapons. Besides this, we  
16 encourage the invention and creation of new weapons in  
17 non-government circles, and it has been decided that  
18 these should be dealt with in the above-mentioned orga-  
19 nization. By this measure all the Japanese scientific  
20 techniques have become rapidly converted to war objec-  
21 tives. From the viewpoint of scientific technique,  
22 the technique of the people in general can now play a  
23 part in the war. We have much to expect from the  
24 result.

25 "Coincident with the domestic policy as

1 mentioned above, the Japanese wartime diplomatic  
2 policy is to strengthen the close relationship with  
3 Germany. In cooperation with our affiliated countries  
4 in Greater East Asia, we will strive to carry out the  
5 war with all our efforts. At the same time we wish  
6 to retain friendly relations with the neutral coun-  
7 tries. Germany is fighting under extremely serious  
8 situations, believing in her final victory, which  
9 courage I admire very much. I firmly believe that she  
10 will overcome the present difficult situation and will  
11 change the tide of the war in her favor in the near  
12 future. I fervently pray for her success.

13 "The nations and races of Greater East Asia  
14 do not show any restlessness despite the present mili-  
15 tary situation. On the contrary, they have been awa-  
16 kened to the necessity of achieving their mission con-  
17 cerning the reconstruction of Greater East Asia. They  
18 are actually intensifying their preparations to fight  
19 bravely in cooperation with Japan, which fact inspires  
20 me with great confidence. It is needless to say that  
21 the relationship between Japan and Manchukuo is in-  
22 separable. The relationship between Japan and China  
23 also is being solidly tightened under the motto of  
24 'to live and die together'. The Japanese armed forces  
25 have been fighting for more than seven years in south



1 and north China. The real intention of Japan lies in  
2 the expulsion of Anglo-American influence, the emanci-  
3 pation of China from oppression by those countries which  
4 has continued for 100 years and the reconstruction of  
5 a Greater East Asia based on morality and a mutual  
6 cooperation. As this real intention has gradually  
7 penetrated into the Chinese people, the cooperation  
8 between Japan and China is steadily increasing. As to  
9 Thailand, the cabinet has been changed and the new cab-  
10 inet under the presidency of Mr. APAIWONGPHON still  
11 holds the policy of carrying on the war based on the  
12 pact. This should, of course, be so but this fact may  
13 be said to be the evidence of the solid unity of Greater  
14 East Asia. One year has already passed since Burma  
15 became an independent country and she is overcoming  
16 many difficulties under the ardent leadership of BAW  
17 MAW, the representative of the nation. Her sound  
18 development and her ardent resolution to carry out the  
19 war give us much hope. The Philippines will soon have  
20 her first anniversary of independence also. Under the  
21 direct leadership of President Laurel she is tiding over  
22 present wartime problems such as food and public peace  
23 and is steadily adjusting her own wartime structure.  
24 In these respects the Philippines could be called a  
25 trustworthy friendly country.

1 "I hereby pay my profound respect to the Chief  
2 Executive of Free India Provisional Government, Mr.  
3 Subhas Chandra Bose, and his followers for their des-  
4 perate efforts for the independence of India. Needless  
5 to say, Japan will give them further powerful support  
6 and will cooperate with them in achieving independence.

7 "As to the East Indies, Japan permitted the  
8 inhabitants to participate in politics according to  
9 their wish. The inhabitants throughout the East Indies  
10 have continuously endeavored to carry out the Greater  
11 East Asia War, recognizing the real intention of Japan.  
12 They have also been cooperating remarkably with the  
13 military government there. In view of these facts we  
14 declare here that we intend to recognize their indepen-  
15 dence in the future in order to ensure the eternal  
16 happiness of the East Indian race. In this way the  
17 Japanese government intends to continue with her former  
18 policy toward Greater East Asia and by developing  
19 strongly the spirit of the Greater East Asia Joint Dec-  
20 laration, she expects to live up to the trust of the  
21 nations of Greater East Asia. Thus, if Greater East  
22 Asia, with Japan as its center and under the firm belief  
23 of victory, further increases its solidarity, concen-  
24 trates its forces both spiritually and materially, and  
25 prosecutes ardently the 'Holy War', which aims at the

1 reconstruction of Greater East Asia, we firmly believe  
2 that we can destroy the ambitions of America and Eng-  
3 land and can express our ideals concerning the world  
4 forever.

5 "In view of the present serious military si-  
6 tuation, we hereby have revealed the government's will  
7 to prosecute the war with 100 million people. I hope  
8 you will understand the government's resolution, and,  
9 taking the lead among the 100 million people, will  
10 strive for the completion of the war. The Government  
11 has proposed the temporary military draft budget in  
12 order to complete the armament to meet the present  
13 critical situation. I hope that approval will be given  
14 after discussion of this budget, together with the above-  
15 mentioned budget concerning food measures."

16 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess now for fifteen  
17 minutes.

18 (Whereupon, at 1050, a recess was  
19 taken until 1105, after which the proceedings  
20 were resumed as follows:)  
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 MR. BROOKS: I am Mr. Brooks for General  
4 KOISO.

5 THE PRESIDENT: Captain Brooks, yes.

6 MR. BROOKS: I wish to ask the Tribunal on  
7 an order to strike out exhibit No. 277. I am object-  
8 ing to it on several grounds. I believe that it is  
9 the prosecution's intent to show a continuation of  
10 policies of former governments, and I object that  
11 this speech which was delivered in 1944 at the open-  
12 ing ceremony when the Premier accepted his position  
13 as Premier and made his opening statement in accord-  
14 ance with the Rescript and orders to him from higher  
15 authority to the Diet --

16 THE PRESIDENT: Do not describe it. We know  
17 what it is. Just state your grounds.

18 MR. BROOKS: I say, I think it is immaterial  
19 and irrelevant to the point in issue because on its  
20 face it shows, in the first paragraph and the last,  
21 that he received the Imperial Command to form the  
22 Cabinet with Admiral YONAI, to assume the responsi-  
23 bility of administering the affairs of state, and  
24 that it was not a change of government; the same  
25 government was in all along; he had just been called



1 to duty. He said further on in that paragraph, "In  
2 obedience to the Imperial Rescript."

3 The first paragraph and the last paragraph --

4 THE PRESIDENT: Now, do summarize your  
5 objections. We know what is in the document just as  
6 well as you do.

7 MR. BROOKS: I wanted to point out two  
8 instances. He says, when he starts the speech, his  
9 purpose was to reveal the government's attitude, but  
10 the government had not changed. And in the end he  
11 said he had revealed the government's will. It is  
12 not his will but the one which has been there all  
13 along.

14 I have been unable to find in the Indictment  
15 any charge against KOISO in relation to this China  
16 Incident which I think this is the phase we are dis-  
17 cussing and, therefore, think it should be stricken  
18 as not being relevant in his case and not proving  
19 anything which they might contend that it was a  
20 continuing policy of a new government.

21 THE PRESIDENT: At first glance it looks  
22 like a speech that any prime minister might make  
23 during a war. But, if this was an aggressive war,  
24 KOISO, if he made that speech, abetted an aggressive  
25 war; and an abettor is a principal offender.

1 But you say he is not charged in the  
2 Indictment with abetting an aggressive war in China.  
3 Can you help us on that, Mr. Parkinson?

4 MR. PARKINSON: As to the Indictment, sir,  
5 Appendix A, Section 2 reads as follows: "Japanese  
6 aggression against China entered a new phase on  
7 July 7th, 1937, when her army invaded China south of  
8 the Great Wall, and her government adopted, supported  
9 and continued the aggression. All subsequent Japan-  
10 ese Governments did the same."

11 THE PRESIDENT: Then Count 2 seems to cover  
12 it.

13 MR. PARKINSON: Yes, sir.

14 THE PRESIDENT: Omitting immaterial parts,  
15 it reads, "All the defendants participated as leaders  
16 in the execution of a common plan of conspiracy and  
17 are responsible for all that performed by themselves  
18 or any person in execution of such plan." The carry-  
19 ing out of the war is the execution of a plan, I  
20 take it.

21 Count 2 goes on, "The object of such plan  
22 was that Japan should secure, among other things, the  
23 economic domination of parts of the Republic of China  
24 and, for that purpose, should wage wars of aggression."  
25 The whole of the particulars in Appendix A relate to

1 this Count. But there is no particular part of the  
2 speech upon which you rely; is that so?

3 MR. PARKINSON: The speech as a whole.

4 THE PRESIDENT: Objection overruled.

5 MR. PARKINSON: If the Court please, Thursday  
6 morning I called to the stand one, ASAMI, Kazuo, who  
7 later stood down, and now I ask that he be released  
8 from further appearance and that Mr. Keenan take  
9 over the next proceeding.

10 THE PRESIDENT: What have the defense to  
11 say?

12 MR. LOGAN: We have no objection to the with-  
13 drawal of the witness.

14 THE PRESIDENT: He is released.

15 Mr. Chief Prosecutor.

16 MR. KEENAN: I call the next witness, Mr.  
17 John Goette.

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1 this Count. But there is no particular part of the  
2 speech upon which you rely; is that so?

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17 John Goette.

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GOETTE

DIRECT

1 J O H N G O E T T E, called as a witness on  
2 behalf of the prosecution, being first duly  
3 sworn, testified as follows:

## DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. KEENAN:

Q Please state your name and address.

7 A John Goette, 340 East 63rd Street, New York  
8 City.

9 Q Have you come from the United States pur-  
10 suant to a request of the International Prosecution  
11 Section to give testimony in this case?

A I have.

13 Q Will you state your age, your profession,  
14 and, briefly, your education and training?

15 A I was born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on  
16 December 3, 1896. I was educated in the public  
17 schools and studied two years in the law school of  
18 Temple University at Philadelphia.

19 In World War 1, I served two years with the  
20 United States Navy, chiefly in the European waters.  
21 The last year of this was in Paris with the Legal  
22 Section of the United States Navy. That was during  
23 the Peace Conference at Versailles. Then I spent one  
24 year writing and studying in India.

25 In March, 1921, I arrived in China, making

GOETTE

DIRECT

1 my headquarters at Peiping. For two years I was  
2 managing editor of the Sino-American News Agency.  
3 In 1924 I was made Chief Correspondent in China for  
4 International News Service and served in that capac-  
5 ity until exchanged by the Japanese in 1942. In that  
6 exchange of Japanese and American newspaper corres-  
7 pondents I returned to the United States in August,  
8 1942 since which time I remained there until coming  
9 for this trial.

10 Q Did you represent any other news services  
11 besides the International News?

12 A I did. I was also correspondent for the  
13 London Daily Express from 1927 until 1940.

14 Q And by reason of service, did you arrive  
15 at the position where you were considered the dean  
16 of the newspaper correspondents of North China?

17 A That is true. That is true. I was the dean  
18 of correspondents in North China.

19 Q Do you have a knowledge of the Chinese  
20 language?

21 A I have an adequate working knowledge of the  
22 Chinese language since I studied it from the time I  
23 first went there in 1921.

24 Q Do you have any knowledge of the Japanese  
25 language?

GOETTE

DIRECT

1           A   Practically none.

2           Q   Will you describe briefly your duties and  
3 work as correspondent of these news agencies, includ-  
4 ing the work you did as the managing editor of the  
5 Sino-American News Agency at Peiping?

6           A   Naturally, my work called for a background  
7 knowledge of Chinese history, Chinese customs and  
8 culture, Chinese geography, economics and politics,  
9 of course; and, as military matters became uppermost  
10 in Chinese affairs, of course, I qualified myself in  
11 that background. All of this was necessary in pre-  
12 paring and sending my messages to the London Daily  
13 Express, International News Service, and for the Sino-  
14 American News Agency.

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W 1 Q Did your work require you and did you have  
o 2 free conferences with the officials of the Chinese  
l 3 Government and other governmental officials who were  
f 4 present in China during your twenty years there?  
& 5

G 6 A That was my daily work; to attend formal  
o 7 press conferences, arrange private interviews, and  
l 8 generally keep in touch with the Chinese or other  
d 9 officials responsible for the government.  
b 10

9 Q Will you state very briefly what you did  
10 with reference -- if anything -- with reference to  
11 investigation of reports of affairs related to you  
12 at these press conferences and the like, in a very  
13 brief fashion?

14 A Of course it was my duty, like any other  
15 correspondents, to screen out the information I  
16 received. That which was important was naturally,  
17 in the course of events, cabled to London or to New  
18 York. Other material would be sent to those sources  
19 by mail.

20 Q Did any Japanese newspaper subscribe and  
21 print reports from the International News Service  
22 during the time that you represented that service?

23 A In the late 1930's the Yomiuri Shimbun  
24 of Tokyo was a subscriber of International News  
25 Service as was the Manchuria Daily News in the



GOETTE

DIRECT

1 Kwantung, a Japanese newspaper.

2 Q Finally, as to your qualifications: What  
3 did you do, if anything, with reference to diaries  
4 and memoranda?

5 A I have kept a diary from 1925 to date. In  
6 addition to that, I kept what I call a log or record,  
7 which was typewritten, of each of the major events  
8 in which I participated or had knowledge of.

9 Q Is that diary in existence now, and if so,  
10 can you tell us where it is?

11 A That diary is with me here in Tokyo.

12 Q And does it contain entries that were made  
13 on the spot and at the time of the incidents herein  
14 referred to that occurred?

15 A It does.

16 Q Are you the author of the published work on  
17 the subject of military matters in China wherein Japan  
18 was implicated? I withdraw the question. Have you  
19 written a book upon the Japanese military movements  
20 in China and Asia?

21 A I have.

22 Q What is the name of it, what is it called?

23 A "Japan Fights for Asia." It was published in  
24 New York -- the American edition -- and in London for  
25 the British edition.

GOETTE

DIRECT

1 Q And have you lectured upon such subjects  
2 in the United States?

3 A During the past three years I have lectured  
4 and spoken on subjects relating to the Far East in  
5 forty states of the United States, and in Mexico and  
6 Canada.

7 Q You are presently employed when you return --  
8 Just before you left and when you returned to the  
9 States -- representing the National Broadcasting  
10 Company and Columbia Broadcasting Company; is that  
11 true?

12 A I am a radio commentator for what is known  
13 as the United Network. This is a short-wave service  
14 issued in a combined form by the Columbia Broadcasting  
15 System and the National Broadcasting System.

16 Q Have you been in Japan before?

17 A I have, on many occasions. This was necessary  
18 in order to get a better idea of the co-relations of  
19 the events and policies between Japan itself and what  
20 was happening in North China, my own field of operation.

21 Q What was the extent of your experience with  
22 reference to observing the Japanese Army, its officials,  
23 the Japanese civilian officials, and Chinese officials  
24 prior to September 18, 1931, the date of the so-called  
25 Manchuria Incident at Mukden?

GOETTE

DIRECT

1           A   Naturally, I was in constant association  
2 and contact with Chinese officials of all the different  
3 ministries and grades. Likewise, I was in and out of  
4 the Japanese Embassy, I should say practically daily,  
5 for the whole twenty years of my service in Peiping.  
6 Furthermore, there was regular contact with the  
7 Japanese military attache of the Embassy in Peiping.

8           In Peiping, some months before the Mukden  
9 Incident, Marshal Chang-Hsueh liang established there  
10 his general military headquarters. This was an im-  
11 portant headquarters because Marshal Chang-Hsueh liang  
12 was known in Chinese as Fu-Su ling. That means  
13 Deputy Commander of all Chinese Nationalist Armies.  
14 In addition to that, Marshal Chang-Hsueh liang was  
15 also the highest ranking Chinese official of Manchuria.  
16 At that headquarters I had regular access to Marshal  
17 Chang-Hsueh liang himself, to his many subordinates,  
18 and particularly to Mr. W. H. Donald, his Australian  
19 political adviser. In addition to those Chinese and  
20 Japanese news contacts there were, of course, the  
21 embassies or legations of many of the foreign powers  
22 with whom, of course, I was in contact. Thus, there  
23 was daily discussion of the international phases  
24 affecting China and Japan, and that area.

25           Q   Where were you at the time of the Mukden

GOETTE

DIRECT

1 Incident occurrence?

2 A I was in Peiping, North China.

3 Q Did you go to Mukden?

4 A I did not. I was requested by my home  
5 editors to remain in Peiping to cover the General  
6 Headquarters of Marshal Chang-Hsueh liang. This  
7 was necessary, because the importance of that head-  
8 quarters in giving the over-all orders to the armies,  
9 wherever they were, and in negotiations. And, there-  
10 fore, there were repercussions to be covered in Peiping  
11 which were not available in Manchuria itself.

12 Q You speak of repercussions. Were there any  
13 specific ones that came to your attention?

14 A In the early days of November, 1931, the  
15 Chinese officials repeatedly discussed with me the  
16 events in Manchuria and their fear that it might spread  
17 to North China. The Chinese officials' fear that the  
18 Japanese operation might spread to North China was  
19 enhanced, as they told me, by the fact that General  
20 Kenji DOHIHARA, then Colonel DOHIHARA, was in North  
21 China.

22 Q Do you remember an incident of a bomb being  
23 sent to Henry Pu-Yi?

24 A I was in Peiping at the time when I was  
25 informed that a fruit basket containing a bomb had



GOETTE

DIRECT

1     been sent to the home of Henry Pu-Yi in the Japanese  
2     Concession at Tientsin.

3             Q     What was the date of that, Mr. Goette, if you  
4     know?

5             A     That was November 8, 1931.

6             Q     What did you do by reference to search or  
7     investigation concerning that bomb so reportedly  
8     sent?

9             A     I was a friend of Henry Pu-Yi's sister-in-  
10    law, the Princess Pu-Jai, and therefore I telephoned  
11    her from Peiping to Tientsin. She told me that the  
12    bomb had been received, but it had not exploded nor  
13    had done any damage except to create excitement and  
14    confusion and bewilderment in their minds as to why  
15    it had been sent to Pu-Yi. Of course, my interest  
16    was to discover the truth that this was another Mukden  
17    Incident in the making. However, I did not find any-  
18    thing that I could say under oath to prove that con-  
19    clusion.

20            Q     Did you go to Tientsin?

21            A     I did not go to Tientsin for another ten days  
22    or two weeks. However, in the meantime, on October 10,  
23  
24  
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GOETTE

DIRECT

1 I was in Marshal Chang-Hsueh liang's headquarters  
2 when his brother, Chang-Hsueh ming, who was the  
3 mayor of Tientsin, telephoned that there had been  
4 a mysterious outbreak of fighting at Tientsin.

5 Q Did you go to Tientsin, and if so, what  
6 did you see with reference to any military movements  
7 of soldiers of any country -- in action or moving?

8 A I was interested to try to verify the  
9 report that the mysterious activity in Tientsin  
10 was linked up with the bomb which had been sent to  
11 Henry Pu-Yi's home. I was accompanied to Tientsin  
12 by Captain C. C. Brown, United States Assistant  
13 Naval Attache at Peiping.

14 Q What was the approximate date that you got  
15 there, and what did you see by way of military  
16 activity?

17 A The approximate date would be about November 20.

18 Q Of what year?

19 A That was the year 1931. Captain Brown and  
20 I were escorted by Chinese officers and police officers  
21 to the trenches which had been dug in the main streets  
22 of Tientsin's native city. There were barricades  
23 erected with troops behind them. I saw the bodies  
24 of dead Chinese soldiers and policemen in the streets,  
25 and I saw the property damage from shelling.

GOETTE

DIRECT

1 Q Who was doing the fighting with the Chinese  
2 troops, and where did they come from, if you know?

3 A In the party escorting Captain Brown and me  
4 were Chinese police and army officials who themselves  
5 had seen in the early days of this fighting Chinese  
6 dressed in plain clothes emerging from the Japanese  
7 Concession of Tientsin to fire upon Chinese police  
8 and military posts.

9 Q Did Pu-Yi, the former Chinese Emperor, remain  
10 in Tientsin, or was he moved from there, if you know,  
11 and to where and with whom, if you can tell us?

12 A On November 10, 1931, I was at Marshal  
13 Chang-Hsueh liang's headquarters in Peiping when the  
14 message came through that Henry Pu-Yi had been taken  
15 to Dairen in Manchuria aboard a Japanese vessel.

16 Q Was DOHIHARA in North China, the Peiping area,  
17 at that time, just prior to Pu-Yi's leaving for Dairen?

18 A All of my official Chinese sources assured  
19 me that he was so present in that area.

20 THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until  
21 half past one.

22 (Whereupon, at 1200, a recess was  
23 taken until 1330, after which the proceed-  
24 ings were resumed as follows:)  
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## AFTERNOON SESSION

The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at 1330.

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

THE PRESIDENT: This Tribunal will not sit on Wednesday, the 14th of August, unless some emergency arises compelling it to sit.

Mr. Chief Prosecutor.

J O H N G O E T T E, called as a witness on behalf of the prosecution, resumed the stand and testified as follows:

BY MR. KEENAN (Continued):

Q Did you remain in Peiping or its environments during all the year of 1932?

A I left Peiping and arrived at Nanking on January 31st, 1932.

Q How did you make the trip from Peiping to Nanking, by what method of conveyance?

A I went by train to Pu-Kow which is on the northern bank of the Yangtze River opposite Nanking.

Q What did you see, if anything, en route to challenge your attention?

A As I was crossing the Yangtze River on the



GOETTE

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1 ferryboat, I personally saw five Japanese warships  
2 drop anchor. I noted that they placed themselves in  
3 a position in which an American destroyer was between  
4 them and the Tiger Hill forts of Nanking.

5 Q Did you say that that was on the 31st of  
6 January, 1932?

7 A That is correct.

8 Q Did you stop at Nanking, or did you proceed  
9 beyond south?

10 A I proceeded to Shanghai where I arrived the  
11 next day, February 1st, 1932.

12 Q And did you learn when you arrived what had  
13 happened at Nanking the day before?

14 A I was officially informed by the Chinese  
15 that those Japanese warships had shelled the Tiger  
16 Hill forts at Nanking.

17 Q What was the date of that attack upon the  
18 forts?

19 A In the course of February 1st.

20 Q 1932?

21 A 1932.

22 Q What was the situation in Shanghai when you  
23 arrived there February 1st, 1932? Will you describe  
24 what you saw?

25 A The situation when I arrived at Shanghai was

GOETTE

DIRECT

1 tense and confused. Street fighting had broken out  
2 between the forces of the Japanese Navy and the  
3 Chinese Army, the Nineteenth Route Army.

4 Q What branch of the Japanese military service  
5 was on duty at the Japanese part of the International  
6 Settlement at Hong-ku or at Shanghai?

7 A That was known as the Japanese Naval Landing  
8 Party. That was a permanent garrison of the Japanese  
9 forces in Shanghai. They had a permanent building  
10 and plant in Hong-ku, that is the Japanese section  
11 of the International Settlement.

12 Q Were the Japanese Marines there?

13 A This Japanese Naval Landing Party takes the  
14 place of what the British and the Americans consider  
15 a marine corps. In other words, they are sailors used  
16 for landing purposes.

17 Q Did you come in proximity to any of these  
18 forces when you arrived there?

19 A I did. I immediately proceeded to the areas  
20 affected by the fighting; that is in Hong-ku and on  
21 the borders of Cha-Peh, the Chinese city.

22 Q Can you describe briefly what you saw by  
23 way of fighting at that time you are now discussing,  
24 after your arrival the first part of February, 1932?

25 A In those first days there were barricades

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DIRECT

1 between the Hong-ku section of the International  
2 Settlement and Cha-Peh, the Chinese Settlement,  
3 manned on either side by Japanese landing party  
4 forces, or on the other side by Chinese troops.  
5 In subsequent days the Japanese Army arrived in  
6 Shanghai, were landed in the International Settlement,  
7 and proceeded to use the International Settlement as  
8 a military base for operations against the Chinese  
9 beyond it.

10 Q Was there any shelling of any fortification?

11 A The Japanese used artillery, tanks, airplanes,  
12 and naval vessels.

13 Q What did they use them for, what did they  
14 do with them?

15 A I personally watched Japanese destroyers  
16 firing point blank range at the Chinese forts at  
17 Wu-Sung which is at the mouth of the river. I daily  
18 watched the Japanese planes bombing the native city  
19 of Cha-Peh in which I had personal knowledge there  
20 were still thousands, perhaps, of Chinese non-combat-  
21 ants.

22 Q You have described the shelling by the Japan-  
23 ese military forces of the Wu-Sung fort. Can you  
24 tell us whether there was any fire back from that  
25 fort, or did you observe it?

GOETTE

DIRECT

1           A    When I watched the Japanese shelling of  
2   the forts, I saw no return fire. I knew of no one  
3   who ever checked whether there was any return fire;  
4   and I went to the forts afterwards with the American  
5   Army officers who gave me the opinion there could not  
6   have been any fire returned by those guns.

7           Q    Were there any airfields being employed by  
8   either of the contending forces?

9           A    I was daily out with the Japanese Army in  
10  the fighting zones and each time that I went to the  
11  fighting zone, I passed at least one large Japanese  
12  airfield with scores of airplanes parked therein.

13          Q    Those were Japanese airplanes?

14          A    They were Japanese airplanes.

15          Q    Were there any Chinese airplanes that you  
16  saw there, or do you know?

17          A    I personally never saw any Chinese airplanes  
18  in the area though I know they had some.

19          Q    Were these airplanes merely reconnaissance  
20  planes or were they strafing or bombing, or can you  
21  tell us about that briefly?

22          A    They were light fighter planes and light  
23  bomber planes such as I saw used on the Chinese city.

24          Q    Did you see any evidence of destruction in the --  
25  to the rear of the city in the farming district?



GOETTE

DIRECT

1           A    I watched the Chinese city burning by day  
2 and night for at least ten days or more as a result  
3 of the bombing. I naturally saw destroyed buildings.

4           Q    Specifically, did you see any bodies of  
5 Chinese civilians around these farmhouses, and if  
6 you saw them, in what condition were they?

7           A    In front of the burned-out Chinese farm-  
8 houses I saw the bodies of Chinese farmers in civil-  
9 ian clothes, hands tied behind their backs, dead.

10          Q    Did the fighting stop, and if so, when and  
11 what occurred then?

12          A    By mid-March, this is 1932, the Chinese  
13 forces had been driven back from beyond the country-  
14 side around Shanghai, and a temporary armistice was  
15 formed along the line set between the Japanese and  
16 Chinese.

17               MR. McMANUS: If your Honor please --

18               THE PRESIDENT: Mr. McManus.

19               MR. McMANUS: I would like to object to this  
20 line of testimony for several reasons: first, that  
21 it is cumulative -- the general testimony and the  
22 general questions that are being asked here; second-  
23 ly, because prosecution now has been presenting its  
24 case for three months. The conspiracy as yet has  
25 not been established. Therefore, I object to it

GOETTE

DIRECT

1 on the grounds of relevancy insofar as its connecting  
2 up any one of these particular defendants.

3 If this witness has any particular know-  
4 ledge concerning any of the defendants, I ask the  
5 Court to request the prosecutor to confine the  
6 testimony of the witness to that particular action  
7 of any one of these defendants.

8 THE PRESIDENT: I have already stated that  
9 the link between the accused, or any of them, and the  
10 episodes being testified to can come at any stage  
11 of the evidence. As to the evidence being cumu-  
12 lative, that really is a matter for the Court.  
13 Evidence becomes cumulative when the Court thinks  
14 it has heard enough. I think we would like the evi-  
15 dence to be briefer than it is in this case, but  
16 subject to what my colleagues think, I cannot say  
17 that it is cumulative.

18 MR. KEENAN: If I might be permitted to  
19 observe with respect, Mr. President, if opposing  
20 counsel who objected is in position to speak for  
21 all of these defendants or accused, if they are  
22 willing to concede that warfare was instituted against  
23 the Chinese people, that it was aggressive in nature,  
24 and that it occurred over a large part of China over  
25 the period of time which we charge, we would be very

GOETTE

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1 glad of our own volition to bring a termination to  
2 this proof. We do not understand that that concession  
3 is made yet, but anytime it becomes clear, we will  
4 be the first ones to, in that manner, attempt to  
5 contribute towards the expediency of this trial.

6 THE PRESIDENT: The objection is overruled.

7 BY MR. KEENAN (Continued):

8 Q What was the next act of warfare, if you  
9 call this warfare, that you saw, and where?

10 A The next act of warfare I did not actually  
11 witness. I had returned to Peiping and was then  
12 closely watching the headquarters of Marshal Chang-  
13 Hsueh-Liang, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the  
14 Chinese National Army.

15 Q What was the next so-called "incident"  
16 with reference to this warfare?

17 A That was the so-called "Shanghaikuan Incident."

18 Q When did that take place approximately?

19 A That took place in the first two or three  
20 days of January, 1933.

21 Q Where were you when it occurred?

22 A I was in Peiping. I was in Peiping at the  
23 time.

24 Q At whose headquarters, if you recall?

25 A I did not quite understand that, sir.

GOETTE

DIRECT

1                   (Whereupon, the last question was  
2                   read back by the official court reporter.)

3           A    I was at the headquarters of Marshal Chang  
4           Hsueh-Liang at Peiping.

5           Q    And was the report of that incident common  
6           knowledge in the environs of Peiping?

7           A    It was.

8           Q    Describe what took place?

9           A    At the station platform in Shanghaikuan  
10          the Japanese Army alleged that some Chinese had  
11          thrown a hand grenade. That was the pretext for  
12          forthright assault -- military assault on the walled  
13          city of Shanghaikuan. Japanese artillery, Japanese  
14          aerial shells were used on the city which finally  
15          capitulated on January 3rd, 1933.

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1 Q You described Shanghaikuan as **adjacent** to  
2 the Great Wall. At that point what provinces are  
3 divided by the Great Wall of China?

4 A The Great Wall is the dividing line between  
5 Manchuria and China proper. On the north side of the  
6 Great Wall is Manchuria; the south side, Hopei  
7 Province at that point.

8 Q And was this the first movement that you know  
9 of, or you learned of, of the Japanese Military forces  
10 south of the Great Wall of China?

11 A This was the first place taken by an assault-  
12 ing Japanese army inside the Great Wall, that is, on  
13 the soil of North China.

14 Q As I understand, the railroad runs from  
15 Peiping to Mukden and at a point is divided and its  
16 operation and control divided at that time. If that  
17 is true, will you describe the situation?

18 A After the Mukden Incident, the Peiping-  
19 Mukden Railway was cut at Shanghaikuan. The northern  
20 portion from Shanghaikuan to Mukden was operated by  
21 the Japanese; the southern section was operated by  
22 the Chinese and ran from Peiping to Shanghaikuan.

23 Q And were there any military forces at this  
24 point of division where the operation was broken into  
25 two parts?

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19 Mukden Railway was cut at Shanghaikuan. The northern  
20 portion from Shanghaikuan to Mukden was operated by  
21 the Japanese; the southern section was operated by  
22 the Chinese and ran from Peiping to Shanghaikuan.

23 Q And were there any military forces at this  
24 point of division where the operation was broken into  
25 two parts?

GOETTE

DIRECT

1       A    There were. Although the railway station  
2   at Shangaikuan is just inside the Great Wall, the  
3   Japanese trains from Manchuria ran there and, there-  
4   fore, there were Japanese troops at the railway station.  
5   The Chinese trains also ran into the same station at  
6   Shangaikuan. Therefore, there were Chinese soldiers  
7   at the same station.

8       Q    And were there incidents in that area at  
9   the time you have spoken of in 1933?

10       A    The Chinese commander in Shangaikuan had  
11   reported everything quiet until this incident occurred.

12       Q    What is the date again of the incident at  
13   this railroad station?

14       A    I would place it as the evening of January 1,  
15   1933.

16       Q    Did you go from Peiping into this area your-  
17   self and make inspections and observe what was going  
18   on?

19       A    I went many times in the course of 1933 into  
20   that general area north of Peiping.

21       Q    Tell us what you saw.

22       A    I personally watched Japanese artillery  
23   shelling Chinese walled cities. I sat in Chinese  
24   trenches with their army watching the Japanese machine-  
25   gun smaller Chinese villages. I personally inspected,

GOETTE

DIRECT

1 on two occasions, one at Mi-Yung and one at Tung-  
2 Chon, American missionary properties which had been  
3 shelled by Japanese airplanes.

4 Q Were any airplanes in action?

5 A I saw Japanese airplanes in action. On one  
6 occasion I was in a motor car with a newspaper  
7 colleague and we were chased for literally hours  
8 by this Japanese airplane.

9 Q Were there soldiers fighting in the field or  
10 in trenches? Can you tell us about that, sir?

11 A It was trench warfare, the old style. The  
12 North China Plain between Peiping and the Great Wall  
13 was criss-crossed by hundreds of miles of trenches.  
14 The Chinese Army manned these trenches. On one  
15 occasion I arrived at a trench just after a Japanese  
16 plane had flown over low and bombed the Chinese there.  
17 I saw the dead bodies and I saw the wounded, spoke  
18 with them.

19 Q When you returned to Peiping from the  
20 observation of these -- of this warfare, did you make  
21 any inquiries at the Japanese Embassy at Peiping?

22 A I always did.

23 Q What inquiry did you make of the Japanese  
24 spokesmen at the Embassy?

25 A I would ask, as in the case of this bombing



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1 I referred to, why it was done, describing what I had  
2 seen. The common answer from both Japanese civilian  
3 and military spokesmen was, "We know nothing about  
4 it," and they were non-committal, would give no  
5 explanation.

6 Q Was that the fighting that terminated by  
7 what was referred to as the Tang-Ku Truce?

8 A That is true.

9 Q That is already covered by a document in this  
10 case. After the -- withdraw the question. Do you  
11 know the date of that agreement of cessation of  
12 hostilities?

13 A May 31, 1933.

14 Q Were the results of it published in Peiping  
15 at the time it was effected?

16 A The general terms and conditions were so  
17 published.

18 Q What did you see after that agreement was  
19 signed in the neighborhood of Peiping?

20 A On two occasions I personally saw armies of  
21 so-called Chinese renegade troops enter the zone de-  
22 militarized by the Tang-Ku Truce.

23 Q Did you talk with some of those forces and  
24 were you able to learn who was in control of them?

25 A Those armies were under two Chinese generals,

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1 one General Feng-Che-Ju and the other General Liu-  
2 Wei-Tang. Those forces entered this demilitarized  
3 zone from Japanese controlled areas and, having passed  
4 across the demilitarized zone, disappeared again into  
5 Japanese held areas. When the Chinese officials in  
6 Peiping admitted their confusion as to what it was  
7 about I went into the area with a newspaper colleague.  
8 When I talked with the officers of these two forces  
9 besides giving anti-Chiang Kai-shek and anti-Nationalist  
10 China slogans, they would give me no reason for their  
11 presence there. I once again saw the troops of  
12 Liu-Wei-Tang. That was on the morning of July 8,  
13 1937, within a few miles of the battle of Marco Polo  
14 Bridge.

15 Q Did you observe anything by way of hostilities  
16 after that?

17 A That area north of Peiping remained quiet  
18 for the next year or more. I might add, militarily  
19 quiet; I don't mean politically quiet.

20 Q Were you in Peiping on the 9th of June, 1935?

21 A I was.

22 Q What took place at that time?

23 A On June 9, 1935, there was enacted the so-  
24 called Ho-UMEZU Agreement. General Ho Ying-chin  
25 was the Chinese Minister of War in Peiping at the time.

GOETTE

DIRECT

1 Q Was there any movement of troops or any  
2 threats of movement of troops that were reported to  
3 you through official sources prior to the Ho-UMEZU  
4 Agreement in 1935?

5 A Chinese officials in Peiping called to my  
6 attention Japanese newspaper dispatches that a large  
7 number of Japanese troops were about to leave Osaka  
8 for North China. Chinese officials then told me  
9 that they were under Japanese threat of full military  
10 occupation of that area unless they made the agree-  
11 ment. Those Chinese officials further told me that  
12 they had been warned not to appeal to Great Britain  
13 or the United States in this case.

14 Q Did you make note of these conferences you  
15 have just referred to and did you report them in the  
16 International News Service press throughout the world?

17 A Naturally I made the notes and naturally I  
18 filed the stories, as did other correspondents in  
19 the area.

20 Q What else did you see of Japanese activities  
21 in that area of Peiping about that time?

22 A Despite the Ho-UMEZU agreement, this war of  
23 nerves was continued.

24 Q I would like to interrupt. Would you tell  
25 us what, in substance, was the Ho-UMEZU Agreement,

GOETTE

DIRECT

1 whether there was any formal agreement or an oral  
2 understanding as it was reported to you and the press?

3 A It was generally accepted that it was a  
4 series of demands made by the Japanese and acceded  
5 to by the Chinese. Whatever the particular form,  
6 whether it was written or oral, I don't know, but I  
7 do know what was carried out thereafter. The results  
8 of that agreement that I observed were the removal  
9 of the provincial capital of Hopei Province from  
10 Tientsin to Paoting.

11 Q In which direction was that?

12 A Paoting was approximately one hundred miles  
13 south of Peiping. In other words, south of the Peiping  
14 area. In addition to that, General Yu-Hsueh-Chun,  
15 the provincial governor of Hopei, was forced to  
16 remove his garrison troops along with his capital.

17 Q That is, the capital of Hopei Province was,  
18 by the terms of that agreement, apparently was moved  
19 a hundred miles south of Peiping?

20 A That is right.

21 And that was some time in 1935?

22 A That was in 1935. There was still another  
23 effect and that was the removal of General Shan-Chen,  
24 commander of the 32nd Army. He and his troops were  
25 likewise forced to move south from the Peiping area.



GOETTE

DIRECT

1           Q    There were, I take it, Chinese troops that  
2   were being moved south?

3           A    Specifically, there were Chinese Nationalist  
4   Armies, not provincial armies.

5           Q    Did any other troops take their place when  
6   they left and moved southward?

7           A    There was left as garrison in Peiping the  
8   29th Army under General Sung-Che-yuan who was chair-  
9   man of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council.  
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1 Q When the **capital** of Hopei Province was moved  
2 south, as you stated, was there any substitution of  
3 any authority? Did the Japanese come in then, or was  
4 it later?

5 A The Japanese did not come in then. But it  
6 made it possible for them to bring more pressure, more  
7 political pressure, upon General Sung Che-Yuan.

8 Q In November of 1935, I call your attention to  
9 an incident of some handbills being spread around in  
10 the Peiping area. Do you recall that?

11 A At that time motor cars went speeding down the  
12 main streets of Peking throwing out handbills contain-  
13 ing an alleged appeal from the peoples of five pro-  
14 vinces to secure autonomy from the nationalist govern-  
15 ment of China.

16 Q Were there planes flying overhead?

17 A Japanese planes, likewise, were overhead  
18 dropping these leaflets of a similar nature on the  
19 city of Peiping.

20 Q Was there any agreement made by Governor Sung,  
21 the military governor, with reference to this five-  
22 province federation, or the suggested federation?

23 A **For** the greater part of 1935 the Chinese  
24 officials told me this Japanese pressure had been  
25 applied to General Sung Che-Yuan. That pressure was

GOETTE

DIRECT

1 that he desert the nationalist government of China and  
2 **head what** was to be known as the Autonomous Federation  
3 of North China. The Japanese project was that the  
4 provinces of Sui-Yuan, Chahar, Hopei, Shantung, and  
5 Honan be incorporated in this North China Autonomous  
6 Federation.

7 Q That would have included how many approximate  
8 square miles and how many millions of population?

9 A This would have involved some 600,000 square  
10 miles of Chinese territory in which 170,000,000 Chinese  
11 people lived.

12 Q Did that agreement go through, or was there  
13 a substitute agreement, settlement?

14 A General Sung Che-Yuan never gave in to that  
15 Japanese pressure nor to any other. However, there  
16 was a Japanese substitute.

17 Q Did that bring about the formation of another  
18 autonomous or so-called autonomous government?

19 A In November, 1935, the Japanese created the  
20 puppet regime known as the East Hopei Anti-Communist  
21 Autonomous Government.

22 Q And was that after these threats and the  
23 pressure that you have referred to before in your tes-  
24 timony?

25 A It followed directly after.

GOETTE

DIRECT

1 MR. WARREN: If the Tribunal please, we  
2 realize that some leading questions have been permitted  
3 by the Court, but we want to object to the constant  
4 leading. It amounts to almost testimony by the chief  
5 prosecutor. We wish to object to it.

6 MR. KEENAN: Your Honor, I am merely pointing  
7 out dates that are well authenticated and established  
8 in history and geographical facts that are printed in  
9 books. In many instances it would be stupid not to  
10 approach it directly so that we could have orderliness  
11 in this trial. Certainly I know what this witness is  
12 going to say before I get him on the witness stand or  
13 I would not call him. I would not have respect for  
14 this Court if I had not gone over these matters very  
15 carefully with him before we present his testimony.  
16 But I do not think I have indicated in any question I  
17 have asked, any testimony I am giving because this is  
18 my first trip in the Orient and this man has lived here  
19 for twenty-five years.

20 THE PRESIDENT: Well, a limited amount of lead-  
21 ing is not only allowed but desirable in dealing with  
22 this class of testimony. If you did not lead, if you  
23 examine him in the strict form and he could not  
24 recollect a date we would be obliged to allow him to  
25 refresh his memory from his notes. And the result



GOETTE

DIRECT

would be the same.

1 MR. WARREN: If the Tribunal please, this  
2 witness not only has his notes but he is being led also.  
3 We think that there ought to be something done about it.  
4 But if that is your ruling, we will accede to it, sir.

5 THE PRESIDENT: I have not ruled yet. But I  
6 do repeat that if Mr. Keenan did not lead this witness  
7 would surely have to refer to his notes and we would  
8 save no time and would get the same answers.

9 The objection is overruled.

10 Q What was the capital of this new so-called  
11 Anti-Communist Autonomous Government in East Hopei?

12 A The capital was Tung-Chou, fifteen miles east  
13 of Peiping.

14 Q How many square miles, approximately, was  
15 there in this new government?

16 A The head of that regime was Yin-Ju-Keng. He  
17 personally told me his territory covered approximately  
18 10,000 square miles.

19 Q Did you travel in this East Hopei area after  
20 this agreement with the new republic?

21 A I did many times.

22 Q What did you see there?

23 A I saw there the Japanese army garrison at  
24 Tung-Chou, Chinese gendarmerie, recruited, officered,  
25 drilled by Japan

GOETTE

DIRECT

1 drilled by Japanese.

2 Q How do you know they were drilled by the  
3 Japanese?

4 A I saw there Japanese officers and talked  
5 with the Chinese gendarmerie themselves.

6 Q Did you notice any change in ways of commerce  
7 or shipping after this new so-called Anti-Communist  
8 Autonomous Government was formed?

9 A This East Hopei regime ran from Manchukuo  
10 to the Peiping area and, of course, had a long  
11 seacoast, and it was common knowledge that it  
12 became the center of drug-smuggling and commodity-  
13 smuggling.

14 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess now for  
15 fifteen minutes.

16 (Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was  
17 taken until 1505, at which time proceedings  
18 were resumed as follows:)  
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Chief Prosecutor.

4 BY MR. KEENAN (Continued):

5 Q Who was the head of this Hopei Anti-Commun-  
6 istic Government?

7 A A Chinese by the name of Jin Yu-keng.

8 Q Will you spell that for us?

9 A J-i-n Y-u-k-e-n-g.

10 Q Did you converse with him?

11 A Many times.

12 Q And were you familiar with the territory  
13 itself and the customs of the people therein?

14 A I was.

15 Q In your conversation with the governor, was  
16 anything said about the number of communists in the  
17 region?

18 A I was struck by the word "Anti-Communist"  
19 in the title of the government. It had not been so  
20 used by any of the Japanese puppet regimes before --  
21 puppet influences; and I asked Jin Yu-keng, "Why  
22 Anti-Communist?" His reply was that there are few,  
23 if any, communists in all of East Hopei.

24 Q This new state or government that you  
25 referred to as beginning some time after June in 1935

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22 Anti-Communist?" His reply was that there are few,  
23 if any, communists in all of East Hopei.

24 Q This new state or government that you  
25 referred to as beginning some time after June in 1935



GOETTE

DIRECT

1 or thereabout -- how long did it continue under such  
2 control?

3 A The regime was inaugurated in November,  
4 1935 and continued in existence as such until the  
5 Japanese formal investment of Peiping in August,  
6 1937.

7 Q Have you ever met the accused DOHIHARA?

8 A I have.

9 Q Was he there during this period that you  
10 referred to, that is, in 1935?

11 A During the period of 1935, all my Chinese  
12 associates insisted that General DOHIHARA was in that  
13 area.

14 Q Did you see him yourself during that time  
15 in 1935?

16 A Neither I nor any of my colleagues saw  
17 DOHIHARA during 1935.

18 Q When, if ever, did you actually see him  
19 there in that region.

20 A I saw and talked with DOHIHARA on February  
21 17 and March 2, 1936.

22 Q And did you seek him out or were you in-  
23 vited alone or with others to converse with him?

24 A On the first occasion, February 17, 1936,  
25 the foreign correspondents were invited by the

GOETTE

DIRECT

1 Japanese Assistant Military Attache to his office  
2 to meet General DOHIHARA.

3 Q And will you tell us what the interview  
4 consisted of and describe it briefly?

5 A The interview produced no results from the  
6 point of view of the newspaper correspondent. We,  
7 naturally, referred to things we had seen happening,  
8 that we knew were happening in North China -- the  
9 military movements, and the political disturbances --  
10 and got nothing except a non-committal reply in any  
11 case from General DOHIHARA. I, personally, was  
12 interested in pressing him on a report that was  
13 current in Chinese circles that it was the Japanese  
14 plan to bring Henry Pu-Yi from Manchuria, restore him  
15 to his old throne in Peiping, thereby consolidating  
16 Manchukuo, as it was then, and North China.

17 Q Specifically addressing your thoughts to  
18 this interview, was that under the auspices of the  
19 Japanese Government or any branch of it?

20 A At that time the Japanese Assistant Military  
21 Attache was Major Tan TAKAHASHI. His office was in  
22 Peking at the Japanese Embassy, and it was he who  
23 invited us correspondents to meet General DOHIHARA,  
24 and we did it in his office in the Japanese Embassy.

25 Q Did he suggest -- did you ask to see

GOETTE

DIRECT

1 DOHIHARA or was it suggested by him that the news-  
2 paper men come to see DOHIHARA?

3 A It was arranged by the Japanese Assistant  
4 Military Attache without our request.

5 Q Were there any other representatives of the  
6 press besides yourself at that interview?

7 A There was present practically the repre-  
8 sentatives of all the great newspapers and agencies  
9 in the world: The Free American Wire Service, the  
10 London Times, Reuters, German newspapers, Japanese  
11 newspapers --

12 Q Was the interview carried on through an  
13 interpreter or without one?

14 A The interview was interpreted from Japanese  
15 into English by the regular interpreter of the  
16 Japanese Assistant Military Attache's office.

17 Q Who was that? Do you know?

18 A His name is Paul OKAGI.

19 Q I call your attention to the early part of  
20 November, 1936. Was there anything out of the  
21 ordinary -- unusual at that time that you now recall?

22 A The American correspondents received an  
23 invitation to the Japanese Embassy or the Military  
24 Attache's office to attend dawn military maneuvers  
25 on November 4, 1936.

GOETTE

DIRECT

1 Q And did you attend them?

2 A These maneuvers were held on hills about  
3 ten miles west of Peiping. One of them, particularly,  
4 was the hill on which the Peiping Country Golf Club  
5 was located, of which I am, incidentally, a member;  
6 and on that morning I was a guest of General  
7 DOHIHARA in my own golf club.

8 Q And these maneuvers, can you describe them  
9 very briefly -- what implements of arms were em-  
10 ployed, and such?

11 A Mock machine gun and infantry positions  
12 were thrown up on the hill, Japanese tanks, artillery,  
13 smoke screens, all types performing in mock battle.  
14 A large part of the Japanese civilian population in  
15 Peiping were invited out there, and there were Women  
16 Nurse Corps in their uniforms and, of course, the  
17 Japanese newspaper correspondents.

18 Q Coming to the 7th day of July, 1937, par-  
19 ticularly in the evening, was there any event that  
20 stands out in your mind or that you recall you  
21 noticed?

22 A On July 7, 1937 I was the guest at dinner  
23 of the United States Ambassador, Nelson T. Johnson.  
24 This was at Peiping. Other guests included General,  
25 then Colonel, Joseph W. Stilwell and General, then



GOETTE

DIRECT

1 Colonel, John T. Marston of the United States Marine  
2 Corps.

3 Q Was your acquaintance with General Stilwell  
4 incidental, or had you known him for some time?

5 A I had known General Stilwell intimately  
6 since 1921, and, incidentally, it was at his suggest-  
7 ion that I am here today.

8 Q Was there anything brought up at that  
9 meeting that you recall particularly?

10 A Colonel Stilwell, as he was then, was  
11 then the United States Military Attache to China.  
12 Colonel Marston was then the Commandant of the  
13 United States Embassy Guard -- the United States  
14 Marine Guard. We had the official report that the  
15 Japanese Embassy Guard intended to stage maneuvers  
16 to the west of Peiping; not only stage maneuvers,  
17 but to stage night maneuvers which was unusual if  
18 not exceptional among the Allied Guards in Peiping.

19 Q And was that the subject matter of some  
20 discussion, without going into it, between yourself,  
21 Colonel Stilwell and Colonel Marston during that  
22 dinner party on the 7th of July?

23 A It was such an unusual event that Ambassador  
24 Johnson, Colonel Stilwell, Colonel Marston, and I  
25 discussed it at great length and its potentialities.

GOETTE

DIRECT

1 Q Was the unusual feature that there were  
2 maneuvers or that they were taking place at night?

3 A The first unusual feature was that they  
4 were night maneuvers, the second that they were  
5 taking place west of Peiping in an area where an  
6 important railway bridge crossed the river. For  
7 the purposes of the International Guards in Peiping  
8 the Chinese Government had set aside an inter-  
9 national rifle range to the east of Peiping, and  
10 that's where the Guards usually went for maneuvers,  
11 not to the west.

12 Q When next did you hear from Colonel  
13 Stilwell?

14 A Colonel Stilwell telephoned me at eight  
15 o'clock the next morning -- that is, July 8, 1937.

16 Q Why did he call you?

17 A In his own words, he said "The Japanese and  
18 Chinese are fighting at Wan-ping. You had better  
19 get going."

20 Q What direction was Wan-ping from the  
21 center of Peiping?

22 A Wan-ping is approximately ten miles south-  
23 west from Peiping.

24 Q And what did you do when you got the  
25 telephone call? Did you get going or stay there?

1           A    At that time I could hear artillery fire  
2 from my home in Peiping, and, naturally, with  
3 another correspondent, I motored out to Wan-ping.

4           Q    Name the members of the party that went  
5 with you. How many were they, who were they, and  
6 what were their positions?

7           A    I went out from Peiping with Mr. A. T.  
8 Steele, then correspondent of the Chicago Daily  
9 News and now correspondent for the New York Herald  
10 Tribune. At Wan-ping we were joined by Major,  
11 then Major, now Colonel, David Barrett, Assistant  
12 Military Attache under Colonel Stilwell.

13          Q    Where is Wan-ping with reference to the  
14 ~~Marco~~ Polo Bridge?

15          A    The west wall of Wan-ping is within a few  
16 hundred yards of the river which the Marco Polo  
17 Bridge spans.

18          Q    And where was the Marco Polo Bridge with  
19 reference to the area previously described where the  
20 night maneuvers were to take place?

21          A    It is the same area.  
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1 Q When you got out to Wan-ping, as you described  
2 your trip with Barrett -- Colonel Barrett and Mr. Steele,  
3 what did you see? Describe what you observed at that  
4 time, in your own language?

5 A We found the east gate of Wan-ping closed.  
6 Chinese sentries were on the wall; we yelled up to  
7 them in Chinese and asked what happened during the  
8 night. They replied that the Japanese had been fir-  
9 ing upon Wan-ping. We asked, "Where are the Japanese?"  
10 They waved across the sandy stretch several hundred  
11 yards wide to a railway embankment. We decided to  
12 go and find the Japanese ourselves -- Barrett, Steele,  
13 and I. We started around the corner of the Wan-ping  
14 wall, when there was a burst of machine-gun fire, and  
15 we fell back. Then we crossed the no-man's land, as  
16 it were, went under -- through an underpass in the  
17 railway embankment, and were at a Japanese machine gun  
18 post. We were taken to the Japanese field commander.  
19 As we passed along the embankment we saw the Japanese  
20 soldiers in hastily dug firing positions, not showing  
21 their heads above the embankment. The Japanese field  
22 commander refused to give us any information whatso-  
23 ever, and motioned us to cross -- to climb the embank-  
24 ment and head back for Wan-ping and the Chinese lines.  
25 Steele and I and Colonel Barrett then returned



GOETTE

DIRECT

1 to Peiping, but that night around dusk Steele and I  
2 went back to Wan-ping. We made our way to the west  
3 gate of Wan-ping with the intention of trying to get  
4 into the city; to get the story from the Chinese  
5 officials. There we were told that the Japanese  
6 troops had issued an ultimatum to the Commander of  
7 Wan-ping that unless he surrendered by seven o'clock  
8 that evening a bombardment would begin.

9 Q What date was that?

10 A July 8, 1937.

11 Q Did the surrender take place within the  
12 period of the ultimatum or demand?

13 Q Just as the Chinese officer came to invite  
14 Mr. Steele and me into the city the Japanese bombard-  
15 ment began promptly at seven o'clock, because the  
16 Chinese refused to surrender. That was seven o'clock,  
17 July 8, when the first firing -- rifle fire and machine-  
18 gun fire down the river, toward the Marco-Polo Bridge,  
19 began, and then the Japanese shells began coming over  
20 into the city.

21 Q Was there an armistice?

22 A There was an armistice. I returned to Wan-ping  
23 on the 10th of July, again in the presence of Colonel  
24 Barrett.

25 Q Will you state what you saw as a result of the

GOETTE

DIRECT

1 firing. if anything?

2 A On July 10 we inspected the damage done to  
3 the military headquarters and the civilian headquarters --  
4 the mayor's magistrate's headquarters -- which were  
5 thoroughly smashed and shattered by shellfire.

6 Q And with reference to the buildings that  
7 were shelled, can you tell us whether or not they  
8 were visible beyond the city wall?

9 A They were one-story Chinese buildings which  
10 were not visible beyond the city wall, if you were out-  
11 side the city.

12 Q Did you learn what type of armored vehicles  
13 passed through the city's streets, if any of them did,  
14 at Wan-ping?

15 A On July 30 Mr. Steele and I went through  
16 Wan-ping, the day after the Chinese troops had re-  
17 treated, and the Japanese had followed through. On  
18 the walls of every building, on each side of the main  
19 street, there was a continuous line of bullet holes,  
20 obviously the machine-gunning by Japanese tanks as  
21 they went through.

22 MR. McMANUS: Mr. President, may I request  
23 at this time that the last half of the witness's last  
24 answer be stricken from the record?

25 THE PRESIDENT: In accordance with our practice,

GOETTE

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1 the request is refused.

2 Q Were you present on the 8th of August in  
3 Peiping when there was any further military move-  
4 ment?

5 A On the 8th of August, 1937, I was in Pei-  
6 ping and watched the formal entry of the Japanese  
7 General, Shozo KAWABE, and his military detachment,  
8 coming in as victors to captured Peiping.

9 Q Was a military governor placed in charge of  
10 Peiping?

11 A Proclamations in Chinese were posted at all  
12 important corners in Peiping. They announced that  
13 Peiping was under Japanese marshal law, that General  
14 KAWABE was the military governor, and threatening  
15 death to anyone who defied their edicts.

16 Q Did you observe the military equipment of  
17 the Japanese as it proceeded through the streets of  
18 Peiping on the 8th of August, in the entry that you  
19 have described?

20 A In that formal victory parade of General  
21 KAWABE were infantry, cavalry, mechanized artillery,  
22 tanks --

23 Q Was there military movement thereafter out  
24 of Peiping?

25 A Was there military what?

GOETTE

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1 Q Military movement proceed from there on?

2 A The Japanese Army then proceeded with a  
3 three-prong military drive; one prong going south  
4 from Peiping down the Peiping-Tientsin Railway toward  
5 Shang Tung, the other down the Peiping-Hankow Railway,  
6 and another one up the Peiping-Sui Yuan Railway, north-  
7 west from Peiping.

8 Q Were these maneuvers or processions, or how  
9 otherwise would you describe them?

10 A This was major war according to the Japanese  
11 Army spokesman with whom I discussed such matters  
12 daily -- twice daily. According to the best reports  
13 that we correspondents could compile from all sources,  
14 within eight weeks after the first shell shot was fired  
15 at Marco-Polo Bridge, there were approximately 160,000  
16 Japanese troops on the soil -- fighting on the soil of  
17 North China.

18 Q Did you have any discussion with any Japanese  
19 officers with reference to comparative movements of  
20 this force?

21 A They were very proud of what the Japanese  
22 Army was accomplishing at this time. The spokesman  
23 for the North China Headquarters of the Japanese Army  
24 was Junzo HIRAOKA. Colonel HIRAOKA showed me his own  
25 figures -- how this Japanese drive, the military drive



GOETTE

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1 in 1937 was moving at a rate, as he put it, three  
2 times as fast as the Japanese were able to move in  
3 the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 and '05.

4 Q On August 31, 1937, did you, along with  
5 others, interview any well-known Japanese General in  
6 that area? I did not ask what area; I would suggest  
7 in the neighborhood of Peiping.

8 A With other European and American correspondents,  
9 I was taken by the Japanese press spokesman -- army  
10 press spokesman -- to Hwai-Lai.

11 Q Will you spell that, please?

12 A H-W-a-i L-a-i. which is approximately one  
13 hundred miles northwest of Peiping, on the Peiping-  
14 Sui Yuan Railway. While I had just been taken a few  
15 days before by the forces of Seishiro ITAGAKI, General  
16 ITAGAKI, I do not believe, had any previous notice that  
17 we were coming to interview him, but we did have an  
18 interview with him on the morning of August 31, 1937,  
19 at Hwai-Lai. General ITAGAKI spoke freely about what  
20 had been accomplished in a military way, and then the  
21 question was put to him: "Is there a possibility that  
22 you may turn south and go to the Yellow River?" We  
23 correspondents were surprised by his reply that it  
24 was possible that he might so turn. We were surprised,  
25 of course, because in those days this was not supposed

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1 to be a full-scale war, but merely an incident.

2 Q Was this interview you had the subject matter  
3 for notes that you made, and will you state whether  
4 or not the interview was published in the press?

5 A I carried my notes back to Peiping and  
6 naturally sent a cable on it. This cable, of course,  
7 was passed by the Japanese Army censorship; the censor  
8 in that case being Colonel HIRAOKA, who had been the  
9 interpreter in the interview with General ITAGAKI.

10 Q Did you travel in other places in the  
11 occupied area of China, as you have described?  
12 When I refer to occupied I mean occupied by Japanese  
13 military forces, of course.

14 A Between July, 1937, and December, 1941, in  
15 which period I was accredited as an American War  
16 correspondent with the Japanese Army, I traveled in  
17 all of the occupied provinces of North China, cover-  
18 ing some twenty thousand miles with the Japanese Army,  
19 and ten thousand miles flying with the Japanese Army  
20 Air Force in China.

21 Q Will you describe briefly what you saw, if  
22 anything, of the evidence of warfare in China in that  
23 area?

24 A I, of course, visited towns and cities and  
25 villages; some of them completely destroyed and

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1 flattened by fire and by shellfire, and by aerial  
2 bombardment; others with great property damage;  
3 villages without a living thing, not only not a  
4 living person, but not an animal or beast, nothing  
5 left, just the hand of death on the village. I  
6 saw numerous civilians shot dead, with their hands  
7 tied behind their backs. I mean I saw the bodies --  
8 not actually shot.

9 THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until  
10 half past nine tomorrow morning.

11 (Whereupon, at 1600, a adjourn-  
12 ment was taken until Tuesday, 13 August, 1946,  
13 at 0930.)  
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